How should multilateral trade policy be designed in a world in which countries differ in terms of market access and technology, and firms with market power differ in terms of productivity? We answer this question in a model of monopolistic competition in which variable markups increasing in firm size are a key source of misallocation across firms and countries. We use `disadvantaged' to refer to countries with smaller market size, worse state of technology (in terms of higher innovation and production costs), and worse geography (in terms of more remoteness from other countries). We show that, in a global welfare perspective, optimal multilateral trade policy should: promote the sales of low cost firms to all countries, but especially to disadvantaged ones; trim the sales of high cost firms to all countries, but especially to disadvantaged ones; reduce firm entry in all countries, but especially in disadvantaged ones. This would not only restore efficiency but also reduce welfare inequality between advantaged and disadvantaged countries if their differences in market size, state of technology and geography are large enough.
Introduction
How should multilateral trade policy be designed in a world in which countries di¤er in terms of market access and technology, and …rms with market power di¤er in terms of productivity? Should trade policy di¤er across countries? Should worse performing (national) …rms be protected from better performing (foreign) rivals? Should national product diversity be shielded against the potentially disruptive e¤ects of cheaper imported goods? The answers to these questions crucially depend on market structure, demand characteristics and technological constraints. In particular, in the 'canonical'models of monopolistic competition with CES demand, iceberg trade friction, sunk entry costs, …xed production costs and constant marginal costs that are (inverse) Pareto distributed across …rms, the free market equilibrium is e¢ cient and there is, therefore, no room for welfare improving policy intervention: free trade is the best multilateral trade policy. More precisely, e¢ ciency of the free market outcome is granted in models in which there is only the monopolistically competitive sector.
When there is also another perfectly competitive ('outside good') sector, the relative size of the monopolistically competitive sector is ine¢ ciently small due to markup pricing. Yet, as the markup is the same and constant across the monopolistic competitors, …rms'sizes are e¢ cient in both absolute and relative terms. This implies that the ine¢ ciently small size of the monopolistically competitive sector materializes entirely through an ine¢ ciently small number of …rms (see, e.g., Melitz and Redding, 2014 and .
The aim of the present paper is to show how all this ceases to hold once the CES assumption is removed, leading to new implications in terms of multilateral trade policy aimed at maximizing the joint welfare of all trade partners. 1 In doing so, we focus on a speci…c deviation from CES known as 'Marshall's Second Law of Demand' (MSLD), according to which demand becomes more inelastic with consumption (Mrazova and Neary, 2013 ). As we discuss below, this assumption is both theoretically and empirically appealing. We show that under MSLD the free trade allocation of resources fails to be e¢ cient in terms of product range, product selection and product mix with the extent of misallocation varying across countries depending on market size, state of technology and geography. For conciseness, we use 'advantaged' ('disadvantaged') to refer to countries with larger (smaller) domestic market size, better (worse) state of technology in terms of lower (higher) innovation and production costs, and better (worse) geography in terms of closer proximity to other countries.
Our …ndings can then be summarized as follows. First, from a welfare point of view, too many products are sold to advantaged countries and too few are sold to disadvantaged ones ('ine¢ cient product range'). Second, conditional on range, relatively too many high cost products are sold to any country ('ine¢ cient product selection'). This ine¢ ciency is, however, more severe for disadvantaged countries. Third, conditional on range and selection, the quantities of high cost products sold to any country are too large and those of low cost products are too small ('ine¢ cient product mix'). Also this ine¢ ciency is more severe for disadvantaged countries. As a result, the free market provides an ine¢ ciently high degree of welfare inequality between advantaged and disadvantaged countries if their di¤erences in market size, state of technology and geography are large enough. There is, therefore, room for welfare improving multilateral policy intervention that: increases sales of low cost …rms to all countries but especially to disadvantaged ones; decreases sales of high cost …rms to all countries but especially to disadvantaged ones; reduces …rm entry in all countries but especially in disadvantaged ones.
In our analytical framework market ine¢ ciency stems from four types of externalities (Nocco, Ottaviano and Salto, 2014; Behrens et al, 2016; Dhingra and Morrow, 2019). First, …rms neglect their impact on product variety. Due to 'love of variety', the product range enters utility as a direct utility-enhancing argument on top of the quantities consumed. This acts as a driver towards too few varieties. Second, by keeping price above marginal cost, …rms leave too much room for entry. This acts as a driver towards too many varieties. Third, …rms neglect the negative impact of their entry on rivals' pro…ts. This also acts as a driver towards too many varieties. These three externalities are the traditional ones already highlighted in earlier models of monopolistic competition (Spence, 1976 ; Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977) and operate also when …rms are not heterogeneous. Their net e¤ect on product range is generally ambiguous depending on the cross-elasticities of demand. A special case arises with CES demand: the opposite externalities exactly o¤set each other so that the free market outcome is e¢ cient (without the 'outside good'). The introduction of …rm heterogeneity does not alter this property as CES demand implies the same constant markup for all …rms so that also the product mix is e¢ cient (Melitz and Redding, 2015) . The presence of a fourth type of externality is tied to MSLD as, with MSLD but not with CES, …rm heterogeneity becomes an additional driver of ine¢ ciency. The fact that demand becomes more inelastic with consumption is re ‡ected in larger markups for …rms with lower marginal cost. As a result, these …rms do not fully trasmit their cost advantage to prices. By softening competition, this generates a positive externality in favor of …rms with higher marginal cost. The externality works at both the intensive and the extensive margins. At the intensive margin, higher marginal cost …rms are ine¢ ciently large relative to lower marginal costs …rms. At the extensive margin, by keeping price above marginal cost more than their higher marginal cost rivals, lower marginal cost …rms leave ine¢ ciently larger room for entry.
Analyzing the MSLD case is important in many respects both theoretically and empirically. As pointed out by Mrazova and Neary (2013) , Marshall (1920) argues this case represents the normal behavior of demand, an opinion shared also by Spence (1976) , Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Krugman (1979) . Subsequent studies have vindicated this view. MSLD plays a crucial role for some of the key traditional (non-CES) implications of trade models with monopolistic competition, including:
'pro-competitive'e¤ects, through which trade liberalization reduces …rms'markups (Krugman, 1979) ; 'pricing to market', through which …rms set c.i.f. prices in each market they sell to rather than simply setting a single f.o.b. price in the market they sell from (Krugman, 1987) ; 'dumping', through which …rms accept a lower pro…t margin per unit sold in foreign than in home markets (Brander and Krugman, 1983) ; and incomplete 'pass through', through which di¤erences in …rms'production costs traslate in less than proportionate price di¤erences (Dornbusch, 1987) . 2 MSLD also underpins some newer implications of those models in the presence of …rm heterogeneity. In particular, better performing …rms (those with lower marginal cost and larger market shares) are predicted to set higher markups (Melitz and Ottaviano, 2008; . 3 Last but not least, several of the implications of MSLD are supported by mounting empirical evidence on …rm performance based on price data (Berman, Martin and Mayer, 2012 ; De Loecker and Goldberg, 2014;
De Loecker, Goldberg, Khandelwal and Pavcnik, 2016) as well as on revenue data . 4 We perform our normative analysis of the free market outcome within the general equilibrium framework proposed by Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) . This model with an 'outside good' and quasi-linear quadratic utility exhibits several features useful for our purposes. 5 As it exhibits linear demand, it satis…es MSLD and thus features pro-competitive e¤ects, pricing to market, dumping, and incomplete pass-through as well as higher markups for better performing …rms. 6 As it is analytically solvable with asymmetries in market size, technology and accessibility for an arbitrary number of countries, it allows for transparent comparative statics in a multi-country setup. As the marginal utility of income is constant and utility is transferable, it allows for a consistent e¢ ciency analysis based on a straightforward de…nition of global welfare for an economy with heterogeneous countries as the sum of all individuals'indirect utilities. While one may note that the absence of income e¤ects gives our investigation some partial equilibrium ‡avor, the framework still shares its focus on social surplus with a large body of trade policy analyses that abstract from distributive issues (Bagwell and Staiger, 2016).
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Our analysis contributes to three main literatures. The …rst is the literature on optimal trade policy under imperfect competition (Grossman and Helpman, 1989; Grossman, 1992 (Flam and Helpman, 1987) ; tari¤s can induce welfare-enhancing additional entry (Venables, 1987) ; tari¤s can improve the terms of trade (Gros, 1987) . 9 With CES demand and monopolistic competition 3 Mayer, Melitz and Ottaviano (2016) show that MSLD entails an increasing relationship between output and markup, and thus the level of pass-through. They also show that, when a stronger restriction (which they call MSLD') holds, there is an additional connection between changes in output and changes in markups, and thus di¤ erences in pass-through: the pass-through rate is lower for better than for worse performing …rms. Speci…cally, MSLD'requires marginal revenue to become more inelastic with consumption and this implies MLSD. 4 Due to its far-reaching implications, MSLD has also attracted renewed interest in the contemporary debate on the qualitative and quantitative e¤ects of trade liberalization, though often disguised under di¤erent headings: "logconcavity in log-prices" (Arkolakis et al, 2015) ; "sub-convexity" (Neary and Mrazova, 2013); "increasing relative love of variety" (Zhelobodko et al, 2012) ; "decreasing elasticity of substitution" (Bertoletti and Epifani, 2014) ; "Adjustable pass-through" (Fabinger and Weyl, 2014) . See Mayer, Melitz and Ottaviano (2016) for a discussion of mappings between these concepts. 5 Irrespective of quasi-linearity, as pointed out by Ossa (2011) , models with a freely traded 'outside good' generate a perfectly elastic labor supply curve and thus isolate the e¤ects of trade policies on …rm location. Models with no 'outside good'generate, instead, a perfectly inelastic labor supply curve and hence isolate the e¤ects of trade policy on the terms of trade. 6 As linear demand also satis…es MSLD', it also features lower pass-through rate for better performing …rms (Mayer, Melitz and Ottaviano, 2016) . 7 The assumption of quasi-linear utility, under which income transfers are utility transfers, is also frequently made in political economy models of trade policy (Grossman and Helpman, 2001 ). 8 For a recent overview of optimal trade policy under perfect competition, see the introductory discussion in Costinot, Donaldson, Vogel and Werning (2015). 9 Flam and Helpman (1987), Gros (1987) and Venables (1987) all rely on variants of the CES two-country model by Krugman (1980) . In a multi-country set-up involving the six major players in recent GATT/WTO negotiations (Brazil, China, the EU, India, Japan, and the US), Ossa (2011) shows that a calibrated version of that model predicts noncooperative tari¤s of the same order of magnitude as the tari¤s observed during the tari¤ war following SmootHawley. à la Krugman (1980) the incentives for a non-cooperative trade policy arise from the desire to eliminate monopolistic distortions and to improve domestic terms of trade (Campolmi, Fadinger and Forlati, 2014 ). More recently, …rm heterogeneity has been introduced in models of monopolistic competition.
When demand is CES as in Melitz (2003) optimal import taxes that discriminate against the most pro…table foreign exporters and optimal export taxes that are uniform across domestic exporters. Campolmi, Fadinger and Forlati (2018) show that with two large countries the Nash equilibrium when both domestic and trade policies are available is characterized by …rst-best-level labor subsidies that achieve production e¢ ciency, and ine¢ cient import subsidies and export taxes that aim at improving domestic terms of trade. Non-CES demand à la Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) is considered by Bagwell and Lee (2015) , who show that in the case of two symmetric countries there is an incentive for a country to introduce a small unilateral import tari¤. They also identify the conditions under which two symmetric countries have unilateral incentives to introduce beggar-thy-neighbor export subsidies. Moreover, in the case of symmetric trade policies, they …nd that global free trade is generally ine¢ cient. Within the same framework but without the outside good, Demidova (2017) shows that a unilateral reduction in a 'wasteful' import tari¤ (i.e. a frictional tari¤ that does not generate any tax revenue) increases the protectionist country's welfare both in the case of two large economies and in the case of a small open economy. Di¤erently, when the import tari¤ is 'non-wasteful'(i.e. it generates tax revenues as in the other foregoing studies), in both cases unilateral trade liberalization reduces the country's welfare.
Our contribution to this literature is the analysis of multilateral trade policy with heterogeneous …rms for an arbitrary number of asymmetric countries that cooperatively maximize global welfare when demand is non-CES. For completeness we also investigate the incentives for a country to deviate from multilateral cooperation: they are consistent with the tradeo¤s already highlighted by the existing literature on unilateral trade policy. 10 The second literature we contribute to studies optimal product variety in models of monopolistic competition without …rm heterogeneity (Spence, 1976, and Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977) and with …rm heterogeneity (Melitz and Redding, 2014; Nocco, Ottaviano and Salto, 2014 and 2017; Dhingra and Morrow, 2019) . This literature focuses on a closed (or 'perfectly integrated') economy or on open economies with symmetric countries. 11 We extend this literature by investigating the role of country asymmetries in terms of market size, geographical barriers to trade and state of technology.
1 0 Ossa (2014) studies noncooperative and cooperative trade policy in a calibrated multi-country multi-industry general equilibrium model with inter-industry trade in the Ricardian tradition as well as intra-industry trade in the wake of Krugman (1980) and thus with CES demand. The model is richer than ours but cannot be solved analytically for an arbitrary number of asymmetric countries. A recent overview of the economics literature on trade agreements, under perfect and imperfect competition, can be found in Bagwell, Bown and Staiger (2016). 1 1 See, e.g., Nocco, Ottaviano and Salto (2017) for a discussion of the main developments in this literature, and for a study of the impact of di¤erent degrees of …rm heterogeneity on the extent of market ine¢ ciencies.
Third and last, we contribute to the growing literature on 'misallocation'in the wake of Hsieh 14 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model and Section 3 derives the free market outcome. Section 4 characterizes the e¢ cient outcome. Section 5 compares the two outcomes, discussing the ine¢ ciency of the former in terms of product range, product selection and product mix. It also analyzes the sources of the ine¢ ciencies and the implications of the two outcomes for international inequality. Section 6 describes the …rst best multilateral trade policies that can be implemented to attain e¢ ciency at the market equilibrium when policy tools are unconstrained.
It also discusses second and third best policies when there are constraints on available tools. Section 7 looks at unilateral deviation from the e¢ cient outcome. Section 8 concludes.
Multi-Country Economy
We follow Melitz and Ottaviano (2008, Appendix) and consider a global economy consisting of M countries, indexed by l = 1; :::; M . Country l is populated by L l consumers, each endowed with one unit of labor, inelastically supplied in a perfectly competitive labor market. Preferences of consumers in l are de…ned over a 'traditional'homogeneous good 0 and a continuum of varieties of a horizontally di¤erentiated 'modern'good. We use l to denote this continuum and index varieties by i 2 l . All 1 2 See Hopenhayn (2014) for a recent appraisal of the broader literature on the role that …rm heterogeneity and the allocation of resources across …rms play in determining aggregate productivity. 1 3 There are very few contributions that explicitly look at misallocation through the lenses of the markup heterogeneity implied by non-CES demand. Epifani The model is applied to the study of the e¤ects that barriers to entry and product market expansion have on aggregate productivity through changes in the markup distribution. 1 4 This is a classical second-best welfare result in the tradition of Bhagwati and Ramaswami (1963) . See Srinivasan (1996) for an appraisal of the ensuing literature.
consumers share the same utility function
where q " 0l and q " l (i) refer to the individual consumption levels of the traditional good and variety i of the modern good respectively. Parameters , and are all positive: is a measure of 'love for variety'; and capture the intensity of preferences for the modern good relative to the traditional one. All consumers have an initial endowment q " 0l of the traditional good, which is assumed to be large enough for its consumption to be strictly positive.
Labor is the only input. It is employed in the production of the traditional good under perfect competition and constant returns to scale with unit labor requirement equal to one. It is also employed in the production of the modern good under monopolistic competition with a one-to-one relation between …rms and varieties. In country l the supply of a variety of this good faces two type of costs: a sunk 'innovation'requirement of f l > 0 units of labor to design the blueprint of the variety; and a 'production'requirement of c units of labor per unit of output. The latter is drawn from a continuous distribution with cumulative density function
This corresponds to the usual case in which marginal productivity 1=c is Pareto distributed with shape parameter k 1 over the support [1=c M;l ; 1). For k = 1 the distribution is uniform on its support [0; c M;l ]. As k rises, density is skewed towards the upper bound of the support. In the limit, as k goes to in…nity, the distribution becomes degenerate at c M;l . Together with f l , c M;l de…nes the 'state of technology'in country l. Comparing the cumulative density functions G l (c) and G h (c) of two countries l and h with the same shape parameter k but di¤erent supports c M;l < c M;h shows that the former …rst-order stochastically dominates the latter as it cumulates more density on the lower part of the overlapping segment of the supports. Accordingly, given that the traditional good's unit labor requirement equals one, c M;h =c M;l > 1 can be interpreted as a measure of country l's 'comparative advantage'in the production of the modern good with respect to country h.
Exchange of varieties of the modern good is hampered by 'iceberg frictions' for international shipments: lh > 1 units have to be shipped from country l for one unit to arrive in country h 6 = l.
These frictions are determined by geographical and technological factors. Crucially, they are not trade policy variables. National shipments do not face, instead, any friction ( ll = 1).
Market Outcome
In the equilibrium consumers maximize utility subject to their budget constraints, …rms maximize pro…ts subject to their technological constraints (for both production and trade), and all markets clear. Choosing the traditional good as numeraire, perfect competition in its market together with free trade implies that both its price and the wage of workers equal one in all countries. 15 Quasi-linearity of utility (1) then implies that workers decide how much to spend of their unit wage on the varieties of the modern good, leaving whatever residual budget to the consumption of the traditional good. The …rst order condition for utility maximization gives individual inverse demand for variety i
for q " l (i) 0, with p l (i) denoting the price of variety i in country l and
l (i) di denoting total individual demand of the di¤erentiated varieties. Aggregation of (3) across consumers leads to aggregate demand of variety i in country l
where the set ;l is the largest subset of l such that demand in l is positive for variety i, N l is the measure ('number') of varieties in ;l (given by the sum of domestic and imported varieties), and
is their average price. Variety i belongs to this set when
where p max l represents the price at which demand for a variety in l is driven to zero.
Product Mix
Turning to modern …rms, pricing to market arises from price discrimination on a geographical basis with …rms setting c.i.f. prices in each market they sell to. 16 We use q lh (c) to denote the quantity sold in country h by a …rm producing in country l at marginal cost c and p lh (c) to denote the corresponding c.i.f. price (h = l refers to domestic transactions). Maximization of pro…ts earned from sales to h are achieved for q lh (c) equal to
where 'm'labels the free market equilibrium values of the variables and
is the total quantity of modern good sold in country h with N E;l denoting the number of entrants in country l. Expression (6) 
Equation (6) These results show that, conditional on the country they produce in (l) and the country they 
Product Selection
Due to free entry, in equilibrium expected pro…t for an entrant in country l is exactly o¤set by the sunk cost f l . Given (2), (7), (8) and hh = 1, this 'free entry condition'can be stated as a function of the cuto¤s for domestic sellers only:
where lh ( lh ) k is an inverse measure of trade frictions from l to h ('trade freeness') ranging between 0 for prohibitive international frictions and 1 for frictionless national trade ( ll = 1). Together with analogous conditions for the other M 1 countries, (9) yields a system of M equations that can be solved for the M equilibrium domestic cuto¤s technology'in country h in terms of both innovation (f h ) and production (c M;h ). 18 The expression of the domestic cuto¤ (10) can be decomposed into two multiplicative components c ma ll
and The second component C ll is, instead, trade-related and combines market access, ease of innovation and comparative advantage. Better accessibility to foreign markets (i.e. higher centrality in the trade network de…ned by P ), lower innovation cost (larger f h =f l ), and higher probability of low cost draws in production (larger (c M;h =c M;l ) k ) lead to a lower C ll . The second component equals 1 when country l is autarkic; it is positive but smaller than 1 otherwise as long as the trade freeness matrix satis…es the triangle inequality and there is some production of the modern good in all countries. 19 This implies (smaller f l ) and production (smaller c M;l ), and that have better access to trade partners (as dictated by P ). These are all factors that foster …rm entry and make competition tougher. Henceforth, for conciseness, we will refer to such countries as 'advantaged'and to the others as 'disadvantaged'. For a given value of the cuto¤, advantaged countries are more attractive to entrants as these anticipate higher pro…ts in case of survival. The cuto¤ is, therefore, lower in such countries to reduce the probability of survival and make …rms indi¤erent about which country to enter by equalizing their expected pro…ts before entering to zero everywhere.
Product Range
To complete the characterization of the free market outcome, we need to pin down the equilibrium numbers of entrants (N E;l ), producers (N P;l ) and sellers (N l ) in each country. For the number of sellers (which determines the 'product range'), we can use c m lh
We focus on situations in which the modern sector is active in all countries. This is indeed the case as long as
holds for all l = 1; :::; M . Given lh > ll = 1, that condition also implies c m ll > c m lh so that marginal exporters have lower marginal cost than marginal producers. 1 9 The trade freeness matrix P sati…es the triangle inequality as long as hl hn nl for all h; l; n = 0; :::; M . When it does, modern production takes place everywhere (C ll > 0 for all l = 0; :::; M ) as long as the cross-country variation of f l , c M;l and hl is not too pronounced. The argument for C ll < 1 is detailed in Appendix A.
for l = 1; :::; M . The key result here is that product variety is richer in countries with lower c m ll . Given (10), these are the advantaged countries. Hence, as in these countries consumers face not only lower prices (as already discussed) but also richer product variety, welfare is higher as captured by indirect utility
Finally, to …nd the equilibrium number of entrants, it is useful to note that the number of sellers from country h to country l equals N hl = N E;h G h (c hl ) (i.e. the share of entrants with marginal cost lower than the cuto¤) so that, given (2), (8) and
This can be combined with (13) to obtain, for l = 1; :::; M , a system of M linear equations that can be solved for the equilibrium number of entrants
The corresponding equilibrium number of producers is then given by N 
Globally E¢ cient Outcome
To evaluate the e¢ ciency of the free market outcome we consider the problem faced by a benevolent social planner who maximizes global welfare taking as given, for each country l, the endowment of labor L l , the endowment of the traditional good q 0l = q " 0l L l , trade frictions and the production functions of the two goods. In the case of the modern good, this means that the planner takes as given the mechanism determining each variety's unit labor requirement c as a random draw from the distribution G l (c) after f l units of labor have been allocated to the design of that variety. As the quasilinearity of (1) implies transferable utility, global welfare W can be expressed as the sum of consumers' utilities across all countries:
For each country l the planner's choice variables are then: the quantity of the traditional good (q 0l = q " 0l L l ); the number of varieties designed (N E;l ); and the quantity of each variety earmarked by country of production l and country of consumption h
). Accordingly, the planner's program can be summarized as max fq 0l ;N E;l ;q lh (c)gj
subject to the resource constraint
for l = 1; :::; M and with ll = 1. In (17) the third term on the left hand side is overall labor employment in the production of the modern good in country l, taking the distribution of c and iceberg
and
Product Mix
The …rst order condition with respect to q lh (c) gives
where 'o'labels the e¢ cient values of the variables and 
for l; h = 1; ::::; M . The relation is, therefore, the same as for the free market equilibrium (see (8)), even though the cuto¤s are di¤erent as we now show.
Product Selection
The cuto¤s of the planner are derived from the …rst order conditions of the planner's problem with respect to N E;l . These require
2 0 This can be seen by substituting 
for l = 1; :::; M . 21 Accordingly, also the expression of the optimal cuto¤ can be decomposed into the product of an autarkic component c oa ll
and the trade-related component C ll de…ned in (12) 
Product Range
As for the number of varieties sold (and thus the 'product range'), we can use the de…nition of 
for l = 1; :::; M . As the e¢ cient number of varieties consumed in l also evaluates to
this expression can be combined with (23) to obtain, for l = 1; :::; M , a system of M linear equations that can be solved for the e¢ cient number of varieties designed
with l = 1; :::; M . The corresponding e¢ cient number of varieties produced in l is then given by
Analogously to the free market outcome, product variety is richer (N o l is larger) in countries with lower c o ll . Given (21) , these are again the advantaged countries. Since indirect utility can be written as
2 1 For the market outcome we focused on situations in which the modern sector is active in all countries, which requires
to hold for all l = 1; :::; M . This condition implies that the same happens also in the e¢ cient outcome. Given lh > hh = 1, it also implies c o ll > c o lh so that marginal exporters have lower marginal cost than marginal producers. such countries enjoy higher welfare.
Market Failure
We are now ready to compare the free market and e¢ cient outcomes in terms of product selection, product mix and product range.
Product Selection
Product selection is determined by cuto¤ (10) in the free market case and by cuto¤ (21) 
As this shows that c 
Product Mix
Turning to output, comparing the free market outcome from (6) with the e¢ cient outcome from (18) gives the quantity gap 
Using (6) and (18) to compare their relative quantities in the two outcomes yields
As this is negative and holds for any c and c
, the distribution of quantities supplied by the planner is always more skewed towards varieties with low unit labor requirement than the distribution at the free market outcome. However, using (8), (19) as well as c . This implies that the ine¢ ciency in the distribution of quantities is more severe in disadvantaged than in advantaged countries. Disadvantaged countries, therefore, not only produce ine¢ ciently larger shares of the varieties they design and import ine¢ ciently larger shares of varieties produced elsewhere, but they also feature a more ine¢ cient product mix biased towards varieties with higher unit labor requirements.
Product Range
The range of products consumed in country l are given by (13) and (23) 1 . The free market product range is, therefore, ine¢ ciently narrow (wide) for large (small) c o ll . Accordingly, the free market makes too few varieties available in disadvantaged countries, and too many varieties available in advantaged countries. This does not imply however that consumption of the modern good is ine¢ ciently low in the former and ine¢ ciently high in the latter. Using (2), (6), (18) , (19) and (21) 
As this is negative, in the free market outcome all countries consume an ine¢ ciently low per-capita amount of the modern good, the more so the larger c o ll . Hence, the under-consumption is more severe in disadvantaged countries. The same holds for the average per-capita consumption of modern varieties as the corresponding gap evaluates to
The fact that all individuals in all countries consume ine¢ ciently little of the modern good implies that the global supply of that good must be ine¢ ciently small. Given q hl for all h, (28) also implies that in the free market outcome trade per capita is ine¢ ciently low at the intensive margin, especially for disadvantaged countries. 22 Given (15) and (24) imply that also the extensive margin of trade is ine¢ ciently low towards these countries. It is, however, ine¢ ciently high towards advantaged countries.
International Inequality
There are …nally implications in terms of welfare inequality between advantaged and disadvantaged countries. Given (14) , (25) and c with the second equality granted by (8) . As this does not depend on the country of production l, we then have that it is also the average quantity consumed in h : q m h = q m lh . Analogously, for the e¢ cient outcome we get: Hence, when di¤erences between advantaged and disadvantaged countries in terms of market size, state of technology and geography are large, the free market provides ine¢ ciently high international inequality. When such di¤erences are small, it provides ine¢ ciently low international inequality.
Distortions and Externalities
The comparison between free market and e¢ cient outcomes in terms of product selection, product mix and product range shows that the free market errs in all three dimensions. First, as the share of entrants that produce in equilibrium is larger than the share of varieties designed but not produced by the planner, the free market is less selective than the planner. As the share of varieties produced but not exported is smaller for the free market than the planner, ine¢ ciently weak selection in equilibrium a¤ects also exports. This ine¢ ciency is more pronounced in disadvantaged countries.
Second, as the supplied quantity of varieties with lower (higher) unit labor requirement is smaller (larger) for the free market than the planner, the free market o¤ers a sub-optimal product mix that is not skewed enough towards lower cost varieties. This holds for both locally produced and imported varieties. A corollary is that, for given unit labor requirement, the free market product basket gives ine¢ ciently small weight to locally produced vs. imported varieties and, among these, to varieties coming from close vs. distant countries (as, due to iceberg frictions, imported varieties have higher delivered cost than locally produced ones, and imported varieties have higher delivered cost from distant than close countries). Also this ine¢ ciency is more pronounced in disadvantaged countries.
Third, the free market provides an ine¢ ciently narrow (wide) range of varieties to disadvantaged (advantaged) countries. Nonetheless, all countries consume an ine¢ ciently low per-capita amount of the modern good due to the dominant impact of ine¢ ciently low average per-capita consumption of varieties. These ine¢ ciencies are again more severe in disadvantaged countries. As a corollary, the fact that in all countries individual consumption of the modern good is ine¢ ciently low implies that also the global supply of that good is ine¢ ciently low.
The for the modern good implies that the product range enters utility as a direct argument on top of the quantities consumed. This …rst type of externality acts as a force tending towards too few varieties since …rms do not take into account their positive impact on the product range when deciding to enter and serve any given market. On the other hand, there are two types of externalities that act as forces tending towards too many varieties. By keeping price above marginal cost, …rms leave more room for entry in the free market equilibrium than it would happen under (shadow) marginal cost pricing associated with the planner's outcome. Moreover, when …rms enter the market, they do not consider their negative impact on rivals'pro…ts.
In general, the net e¤ect on product range is ambiguous as it depends on the cross elasticities of demand. A special case arises with CES demand. Without the traditional good, the opposite externalities exactly o¤set each other so that the free market and e¢ cient outcomes coincide. With the traditional good ('outside good'), the free market still provides the e¢ cient amount of each variety but, due to markup pricing, an ine¢ ciently small number of varieties. The modern good is, therefore, under-supplied relative to the traditional one. The fact that CES implies the same markup for all …rms determines the e¢ ciency of the product mix between locally produced and imported varieties at the free market outcome. The introduction of …rm heterogeneity does not alter these properties (Melitz and Redding, 2015) .
The fourth type of externality materializes, instead, in the presence of …rm heterogeneity and, crucially, MSLD. The fact that demand becomes more inelastic with consumption is re ‡ected in larger markups for …rms with lower marginal cost so that these …rms do not fully transmit their cost advantage to prices. 24 This generates a positive externality in favor of …rms with higher marginal cost. The externality works at the intensive margin: higher marginal cost …rms are ine¢ ciently large relative to lower marginal costs …rms. It also works at the extensive margin: by keeping price above marginal cost more than higher marginal cost rivals, lower marginal cost …rms leave ine¢ ciently larger room for entry. This applies both to domestic and foreign rivals. Hence, with MSLD but not with CES, …rm heterogeneity becomes an additional driver of ine¢ ciency.
A lower cuto¤ reduces these distortions. By reducing the prices of all …rms but disproportionately those of …rms with lower marginal cost and larger markup, it forces these …rms to trasmit more of their cost advantage to prices. 25 This explains why welfare is higher in advantaged countries where sellers face lower cuto¤s.
Optimal Multilateral Policy
The analysis in the previous section has drawn a complex map of market failures. There are several ways in which the free market outcome departs from the e¢ cient outcome, in terms of product selection, product mix and product range. Moreover, the extent (and sometimes also the direction) of the departures is country or …rm speci…c. We will now characterize the tools that national policy makers can use cooperatively to make the market achieve the e¢ cient outcome in a decentralized fashion. For this to happen, we will need to give the policy makers an unconstrained choice of tools ('…rst best'), including country-speci…c and variety/…rm-speci…c consumption/production subsidies/taxes as well as lump-sum transfers for consumers and …rms. We will then comment on what policy makers could achieve when deprived of the use of variety/…rm-speci…c consumption/production subsidies/taxes ('second best') and also of lump-sum transfers for …rms ('third best'). 2 4 Recall that the markup on sales from h to l of a …rm with marginal cost c is hl (c) = c m ll hl c =2. 
First Best Policies
The e¢ cient outcome can be decentralized through country-pair variety speci…c per-unit transfers s hl (c) subsidizing (taxing) trade of low (high) marginal cost varieties from country h to country l (l = 1; :::; M ), complemented by country-speci…c lump-sum taxes on …rms' pro…ts in h and consumers'incomes. For international trade from h to l 6 = h, per-unit subsidies can indi¤erently take the form of export subsidies in the production country or import subsidies in the consumption country.
Analogously, per-unit taxes can indi¤erently be export taxes in the production country or import tari¤s in the consumption country. For domestic trade within country h, per-unit transfers can indifferently take the form of production subsidies (taxes) for local …rms or consumption subsidies (taxes) for local consumers. In any case, due to the externalities discussed in the previous section, free trade is not e¢ cient and restoring e¢ ciency requires policy tools that vary across countries and …rms. One size does not …t all.
Per-Unit Transfers
Per-unit transfers are needed to remove the product mix distortion. Consider quantity q hl (c) supplied to country l by a …rm producing in country h at marginal cost c. Let s & hl (c) and s hl (c) denote per-unit consumption and production transfers earmarked to that quantity. Given (3), (6), (4) and (5) 
which is non-negative as long as c is not larger than the cuto¤ c s hl , i.e. the value of the marginal cost such that
The e¢ cient outcome is achieved when the corresponding price which is larger for disadvantaged countries. 26 
Lump-Sum Transfers
Lump-sum transfers are needed to deal with the distortions in product selection and product range.
Let S h be a lump-sum transfer for …rms in country h. It is a subsidy if positive and a tax if negative.
Marginal cost pricing implies that producers make no pro…ts so that all they eventually earn in excess of marginal cost comes from per-unit subsidies. Accordingly, given (29), (30) and (32), the earnings on quantity supplied to l by a …rm producing in h at marginal cost c evaluate to
The 'free entry condition'in country h can then be stated as
which by (2) and (19) can be rewritten as For l = 1; :::; M this yields a system of M equations that can be solved for the M equilibrium cuto¤s
Comparing (34) with (21) reveals that decentralization of the e¢ cient outcome requires to set S h = f h . Being negative, this amounts to a country-speci…c lump-sum tax on …rm pro…t (
which is higher in disadvantaged countries as these face higher innovation costs. Without the pro…t tax, e¢ cient per-unit transfers would generate expected earnings that are higher than the innovation cost so that free entry would lead to a decentralized cuto¤ smaller than the e¢ cient one. The lumpsum transfers also implement the e¢ cient numbers of entrants, producers and sellers in each country.
Given (30) and (29) (23). 27 E¢ ciency can also be gauged from the fact that, as discussed in Section 4.3, the e¢ cient number of sellers is alternatively given
Then, the derivation we followed for the free market outcome implies that also the number of entrants is the e¢ cient one N o E;l . The same holds for the number of producers as this is given by
To close the characterization of e¢ cient decentralization, we need to check whether the revenues from the lump-sum taxes on …rms'pro…ts together with those from the per-unit taxes on high marginal cost …rms are enough to …nance the per-unit subsidies to low marginal cost …rms. This can be done by computing the aggregate net per-unit transfers across all …rms and countries. These aggregate transfers total
where the second equality is granted by the free entry condition (33) and the term between brackets is the average transfer for quantities produced in l and sold in h. 28 As S o is positive, per-unit taxes do not generate enough revenues to cover per-unit subsidies. Moreover, given
implies that aggregate net per-unit transfers P M l=1 T l = P M l=1 f l are twice as large as aggregate tax revenues from lump-sum taxes on …rm pro…ts. This de…cit can be …nanced through an additional lump-sum tax on consumers equal to
Hence, the de…cit generated by per-unit transfers is equally shared between producers and consumers. Note, however, that the payments of lump-sum pro…t taxes are earmarked by production country whereas the distribution of the burden of lump-sum consumption taxes is immaterial due to the absence of income e¤ects. The reason for this di¤erence is that the former are used to correct distortions while the latter only for budget balance. 29 2 7 The average delivered price quoted by …rms producing in h for sales to l is de…ned as
. By (2) this evaluates to p o hl = [k= (k + 1)] hl c o hl , which in turn by (19) can be rewritten as p o hl = [k= (k + 1)]c o ll . As this does not depend on the country of production, averaging across countries of production gives p o l = p o hl . 2 8 See footnote (26) . 2 9 Which countries run the bigger de…cit per capita before consumer taxation is not a well de…ned question as it is
Second and Third Best Policies
The decentralization of the e¢ cient outcome requires to set trade subsidies and taxes that di¤er not only across countries but also across varieties produced at di¤erent marginal cost. We now analyze what is achievable when subsidies and taxes can vary across countries but not across shipments made by …rms between the same country pair. When this is the case, policy makers do not have enough tools to remove all distortions. In particular, as they have to use the same per-unit transfer s lh for all shipments from country l to country h, they lack the speci…c tools needed to target the product mix distortion.
In this second best scenario, policy makers implement the 'constrained'optimal allocation of a planner who cannot a¤ect the relation between quantity and cuto¤ dictated by (6) . This planner thus maximizes welfare (16), subject not only to the resource constraint (17) but also to the product mix constraint (6), with respect to the choice variables q 0l , N E;l and c lh (instead of q lh (c)) for l; h = 1; :::; M . 
for h; l = 1; ::::; M , with the relation between domestic and foreign cuto¤s given once more by c co hl = c co ll = hl . Pro…t maximization also determines the 'constrained'e¢ cient number of entrants as
with associated number of producers N The 'constrained'e¢ cient outcome exhibits similar properties as the free market and ('unconstrained') e¢ cient outcomes. In particular, also the 'constrained'planner follows a cuto¤ rule: only varieties with low enough marginal cost (c c co lh ) are produced in country h for consumption in country l. The cuto¤ marginal cost c co lh is lower in advantaged countries. Moreover, conditional on the countries of production and consumption, varieties with lower unit labor requirement c are supplied in larger amounts, the more so the lower the cuto¤ in the country of consumption.
The cuto¤ is, however, larger for the 'constrained' planner than for the free market outcome and even larger than for the 'unconstrained' planner: c 
matched by a lump-sum pro…t tax common to all …rms producing in the same given country h equal to T co h = f h =(2k + 1) for all h; l = 1; :::; M . The per-unit trade subsidy is thus larger for supplies to disadvantaged countries, which however face also higher lump-sum pro…t taxes due to higher innovation costs.
Comparing the …rst and second best policy tools reveals that the 'constrained'e¢ cient per-unit trade subsidy s co l is smaller than the average 'unconstrained'e¢ cient per-unit trade subsidy s o l . The aggregate 'constrained'e¢ cient trade subsidy corresponding to (37) amounts to
which is k + 2 times larger than aggregate revenues from lump-sum pro…t taxation as these are equal to
. This implies that …rms bear less than half of the subsidy burden with the rest …nanced by lump-sum taxes on consumers.
It is also interesting to analyze the situation that corresponds to the traditional 'second-best problem' in entry models without …rm heterogeneity (Mankiw and Whinston, 1986) . In this case policy makers have the tools needed to manipulate the number of entrants but not those that would allow them to a¤ect …rm behavior after entry due to the unavailability of lump sum transfers for …rms. They are therefore forced to take that behavior as given. For concreteness, we call this the 'third best scenario', in which policy makers implement the optimal allocation of a planner who is not only unable to a¤ect the relation between quantity and cuto¤ dictated by (6) and thus cannot remove the product mix distortion, but is also unable to choose the cuto¤ to deal with the product selection distortion. Speci…cally, this 'third best planner'maximizes welfare (16) with respect to q 0l and N E;l for l = 1; :::; M , subject not only to the resource constraint (17) and the product mix constraint (6) but also to the free entry condition (9) as this condition, together with the relation between domestic and foreign cuto¤s given once more by c m hl = c m ll = hl , imposes the free market cuto¤ (10) on the planner. Solving this maximization problem yields the third best number of entrants
with associated number of producers N As the third best outcome entails the same cuto¤ as the free market outcome, it shares the same properties of the free market in terms of selection. However, comparing the two outcomes reveals that in each country the number of entrants, the number of producers, the range of products sold and the range of products exported are richer in the third best allocation than in the free market equilibrium, whereas not only the cuto¤ but also individual and average quantities supplied by …rms are the same in the two outcomes. This way the third best planner partially compensates the product mix and product selection distortions with richer product range of the modern good.
Just like the second best outcome, also the third best outcome can be decentralized through a per-unit trade subsidy common to all …rms selling to any given country l 
with no associated lump-sum pro…t tax levied in this case as this tool is not available. 30 The third best subsidy is larger for supplies to disadvantaged countries as these have larger cuto¤ c 
which is totally …nanced by lump-sum taxes on consumers as there are no lump-sum tools for …rms.
Unilateral Deviation
We conclude our analysis by studying whether countries have any incentive to deviate unilaterally from the (globally) e¢ cient outcome and, if that were the case, how deviations would take place depending on countries being advantaged or disadvantaged.
Speci…cally, we consider the problem faced by a benevolent social planner in country l who maximizes local welfare W l = U l L l with U l as in (1) . This local planner takes as exogenously given the endowment of labor, the endowment of the traditional good, the production technologies of the two goods, the trade frictions and the innovation technology of the modern good. The local planner also considers as exogenously given at their globally e¢ cient values all foreign-related variables, including the prices of imports but excluding the prices of modern exports and the bilateral trade ‡ows between country l and all the other countries h 6 = l = 1; :::; M .
The local planner then solves max fq 0l ;N E;l ;q ll (c);q lh (c);q hl (c)gj
subject to the country's resource and technology constraints as well as the trade balance condition.
The resource and technology constraints together imply
whereby the consumption of the traditional good equals the sum of its endowment, its local production and its net imports X 0l , which due to balanced trade must be matched in value by the net exports of the modern good
where the (shadow) price of the modern good is normalized to 1 by choice of numeraire and the (shadow) prices of exported and imported modern varieties are denoted by p lh (c) and p hl (c) respectively. The export (shadow) price p lh (c) is related to the corresponding quantity by the inverse demand
where the domestic cuto¤ c o hh of foreign country h 6 = l is taken as exogenously given at the globally optimal level due the small country assumption. This holds also the number N (19) . The local planner's problem can be solved by …rst using (41), (42) and (43) to substitute q 0l out of (40) and then maximizing the resulting expression with respect to country l's domestic quantities q ll (c), imported quantities q hl (c), exported quantities q lh (c) and number of locally designed varieties N E;l .
Product Mix
The …rst order condition with respect to q hl (c) gives
where 'u'labels the local welfare maximizing values of the variables and
The local planner thus follows a cuto¤ rule for imports: only varieties with low enough unit labor requirement (c c u ll = hl ) are allowed into country l and, conditional on the country of origin, varieties with lower unit labor requirement c are supplied in larger amounts than those with higher c, the more so the lower the cuto¤ in country l. Quantity q Results (44) and (45) 
Hence, (44), (45) and (46) mirror the corresponding results (18) and (19) in the globally e¢ cient outcome, but with di¤erent cuto¤s.
The …rst order condition with respect to q lh (c) gives To recap, the local planner's prices for modern exports to all destinations are above delivered marginal costs and are thus higher than the global planner's ones; locally e¢ cient quantities exported are, instead, below the globally e¢ cient ones. Di¤erently, the local planner's prices for domestic sales and imports are equal to delivered marginal costs and thus coincide with the global planner's ones.
Whether the corresponding quantities also coincide depends on whether the two planners' domestic cuto¤s in l are the same. Markup pricing on exports implies that a country that unilaterally deviates from the globally e¢ cient outcome exploits foreign love of variety in the modern good to extract rents from its trading partners or, equivalently, to improve its terms of trade.
Product Selection
To …nd the local planner's optimal cuto¤ we have to look at the …rst order condition with respect to
This can be compared with the analogous expression for the global planner (20) to express the local planner's optimal cuto¤ as 
is larger for advantaged countries as their C ll is smaller.
Product Range
As for the number of varieties sold (and thus the 'product range'), we can exploit the de…nition of c u ll from (44) , the relation between c u hl and c u ll from (48) , and the expression for Q u l obtained using (44) and (45) 
The locally e¢ cient number of varieties sold in l also evaluates to
while the globally e¢ cient number also evaluates to
These two expressions can be combined with (53) and (23) . 33 Based on (52), the gaps in these numbers between the local and global planners are larger for advantaged countries.
Finally, indirect utility in the deviating country can be written as
which is higher that U o l by the revealed preference of the local planner. Comparing (54) with (25) shows that the local planner more than compensate the loss in allocative e¢ ciency captured by the second term on the right hand side of (54) 
Then, given that N u l < N o l holds, it follows that also N u P;l < N o P;l must hold.
Deviant Policies
The policy tools needed to decentralize the locally e¢ cient outcome can be determined through the same logic followed to decentralize the globally e¢ cient outcome in Section (6.1). Accordingly, the locally e¢ cient quantities of imports and domestic sales can be implemented at marginal cost pricing by introducing per-unit transfers equal to 
respectively. For both domestic sales and shipments from any foreign country h, the average per-unit transfer across all …rms and countries is
which is larger than in the globally e¢ cient outcome for all countries and larger for disadvantaged than advantaged countries. Di¤erently, the implementation of the locally e¢ cient quantities of exports at markup pricing does not require any active policy intervention as, for given c The …rst term on the left hand side refers to the earnings that prospective entrants can expect on domestic sales. As …rms price at marginal cost, all earnings come in the form of per-unit subsidies. The second term refers to pro…ts gained on export sales thanks to markup pricing. Using (45) , (47), (49) and (55) This is a lump-sum tax on pro…t that is larger in advantaged than disadvantaged countries.
Hence, the deviating country's policies consist of a lump-sum pro…t tax, per-unit subsidies to domestic sales and imports, and laissez-faire for exports.
Conclusion
We have addressed the question how multilateral trade policy should be designed in a world in which countries di¤er in terms of market access and technology, and …rms with market power di¤er in terms of productivity. We have argued that, in general, the answer depends on market structure, demand characteristics and technological constraints. In the 'canonical' models of monopolistic competition with CES demand, iceberg trade friction, sunk entry costs, …xed production and constant marginal costs that are (inverse) Pareto distributed across …rms, the free market equilibrium is e¢ cient. Accordingly, free trade is the best multilateral trade policy and there is no room for welfare improving policy intervention.
This property of the free market equilibrium does not carry on to monopolistic competitive models in which demand is not CES. We have argued that an important departure from CES materializes when demand satis…es 'Marshall's Second Law of Demand'(MSLD), according to which demand becomes more inelastic with consumption. We have shown that, in a model with linear demand satisfying MSLD, the free trade allocation of resources is ine¢ cient in terms of product range, product selection and product mix, and that the extent of ine¢ ciency varies across countries depending on market size, state of technology and geography.
We have used the term 'disadvantaged' to refer to countries with smaller market size, worse state of technology (in terms of higher innovation and average production costs), and worse geography (in terms of more pronounced remoteness from countries with better state of technology). We have found that, from a global welfare viewpoint, optimal multilateral trade policy should act as follows.
On the one hand, to remove the product mix ine¢ ciency, it should promote the sales of low cost …rms to all countries, but especially to disadvantaged ones. It should also trim the sales of high cost …rms to all countries, but especially to disadvantaged ones. On the other hand, to simultaneously remove the product range and product selection ine¢ ciencies, it should reduce …rm entry in all countries, but especially in disadvantaged ones. This would not only restore e¢ ciency but also reduce welfare inequality between advantaged and disadvantaged countries provided that their di¤erences in market size, state of technology and geography are large enough.
Such an optimal trade policy requires to set trade subsidies and taxes that di¤er not only across countries but also across products supplied at di¤erent marginal cost. We have also analyzed what is achievable in a restricted scenario in which subsidies and taxes vary across countries but not across …rms. In this case, the product mix ine¢ ciency cannot be targeted speci…cally and the resulting 'constrained'optimal trade policy should (partially) compensate the welfare loss due to the product mix distortion with larger consumption of all products, especially in disadvantaged countries. When the additional unavailability of lump sum tools for …rms makes it impossible to target not only the product mix distortion but also the product selection distortion the (even more) 'constrained'optimal trade policy should (partially) compensate the corresponding welfare losses with richer product variety, especially in disadvantaged countries. Finally, we have shown that all countries have a unilateral incentive to deviate from the optimal multilateral outcome in order to extract rents from their trading partners or, equivalently, to improve their terms of trade. In doing so, advantaged countries impose bigger allocative distortions to their own economies than disadvantaged countries do as the former are able to extract more rents than the latter.
where the second equality is granted by (10) . By construction, the cuto¤ c 
Finally, the number of entrants can be determined as follows. By de…nition, given (2), c 
Second Best
The implementation of N 
Accordingly, the pro…t tax T 
Third Best
The implementation of N which corresponds to expression (39) in Section 6.2.
